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THE GRASS Is GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE: FIiDNG
A REMEDY FOR PALESTINIAN FARMERS FOR HARMS
CREATED BY THE ISRAELI SECURITY WALL
Omar Ghani *
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the various positions and arguments surrounding
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it should be conceded that one
group in particular has suffered harms and injuries that should
be remedied. From the confiscation of Palestinian occupied lands
to the Intifadas, many Palestinian farmers have suffered
economic hardships due to this conflict. Their despondent
circumstances have worsened since the construction of the Israeli
Security Wall. Ideological debates and conversations regarding
human rights may be important, but can lead to abstracting
human lives. Thus, the conversations surrounding the impact of
this conflict are causing the neglect of actual circumstances and
human lives these conversations purport to consider. Palestinian
farmers are a subset of a population who have greatly suffered
and are left without a remedy to rectify their harms.
Because the international community seeks peace in this
conflict, a mechanism or program should be established to
compensate Palestinian farmers for the harms they have
suffered. This Note first examines the harms that Palestinian
farmers have suffered and concludes that their harms require a
specific program to ensure they are not susceptible to suffering
the same harms repeatedly. Next, it establishes that procedural
justice is a theory that should be the foremost mechanism or
program in compensating these farmers. With this objective in
mind, we can then evaluate international and domestic models
that implement judicial or extrajudicial schemes and conclude
that domestic models and extrajudicial programs are the most
effective method to ensure procedural justice for Palestinian
* Staff Editor of the KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.; BA, 2015,
University of Kentucky; J.D. expected May 2018, University of Kentucky College of Law.
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farmers. Finally, this Note provides an exemplary new model for
Palestinian farmers that would justly compensate Palestinian
farmers by exploring the components and aspects of previous
systems that have been proven to uphold procedural justice.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The IsraeLi Security Wal
The construction of the Israeli Security Wall began in the
West Bank in June 2002.1 The Security Wall is planned to be 736
kilometers in length.2 The Security Wall is planned to be built
according to the Green Line, which is the border that was
established between Israel and Palestine in 1949.3 The Israeli
Security Wall has yet to be completed, but in 2010, 180
kilometers (113 miles) had been constructed.4 Of the 5,640 square
miles that comprise the area known as the West Bank, 10 to 16
percent of the West Bank has been appropriated by the Wall.5
This portion of the West Bank is agriculturally significant as it is
among the most fertile land in the West Bank.6 For example,
thirty wells, which were used to irrigate the land, were
appropriated by the Israeli Security Wall.7
B. The Impact of the IsraeLi Security Wall
In the portion of the West Bank that has been
appropriated to construct the wall, both the environment and
Palestinian farmers cultivating the land have been impacted. For
example, in the Jayyous Village, the construction of the wall
I Andrew Malone, Water Now: The Impact of Israeli's Security Fence on
Palestinian Water Rights and Agriculture in the West Bank, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
639, 645 (2004).
2 Ahnad H. Sa'di, The Borders of Colonial Encounter: The Case ofIsraefs Wall,
38 ASIAN J. Soc. Sci. 46, 52 (2010).
3 Malone, supra note 1, at 648.
4 Sa'di, supra note 2, at 52.
5 Salem A. Thawaba et al., Jerusalem Walls: Transforming and Segregating
Urban Fabric, 10 AFRICAN & ASIAN STUD. 121, 124 (2011).
6 Malone, supra note 1, at 642.
SId. at 645.
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uprooted 2,500 olive trees.8 This is not unique to the Jayyous
Village, as it has been estimated that approximately 100,000
olive trees were removed for the construction of the Wall.9
The completion of the Wall will impact Palestinians more
directly as approximately 400,000 Palestinians will need to pass
through the Wall in order to reach their farmlands and jobs.10
Israel has established checkpoints along the wall." As of 2017,
there are twenty-seven checkpoints in the West Bank, which are
located on the Green Line or in the Israeli Security Wall.12 In
order for Palestinians in the West Bank to be granted entry
through a checkpoint in the Security Wall, they must have a
permit.13 This has deprived many farmers access to their farms
that were expropriated by the Security Wall.
For example, in the Jayyous Village, farmers traditionally
left their village to work on their farms.14 However, with the
Wall's construction, farmers must now pass through the North
Gate of the Wall.'5 This gate is open three times a day during the
morning, midday, and before sunset. 16 These official openings are
frequently not observed, which causes farmers attempting to
access their land to wait for hours for the gate to open.'7
Furthermore, merely 40 percent of farmers from the
Jayyous Village have permits to pass through the security wall. 8
Many farmers cannot qualify for a permit due to the requirement
of showing a purchase of an Israeli deed to their farmland.'9
Therefore, farmers with Ottoman or Jordanian deeds cannot
8 Maurice Hopper, Geography and Security: Citizenship Denied, 30 TEACHING
GEOGRAPHY 130, 133 (2005).
9 Id.
1o Id. at 135.
11 Restriction ofMovement: Statistics on Checkpoints and Roadblocks, B'TSELEM
(Jan. 1, 2017),
http://www.btselem.org/freedom of movement/old/copy%20of/o20checkpoints
[https://perma.ccl6ZZN-K4EC].
12Id.
14 Hopper, supra note 8, at 132.
'5 Id.
16 Id.
171Id.
18 Id. at 135.
19 Id.
4792016-2017
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receive a permit.20 This issue is compounded by a demoded
Ottoman law found in Israeli law stating that land that is not
cultivated for three years returns to the state.21 Consequently,
those farmers without permits may lose their farmland due to the
restrictions on the access to their farmland.22 From 2006 to 2009,
the percentage of permits allowing farmers in the West Bank to
access their land decreased by 90 percent.23
There is also the insidious harm of land degradation. Land
use changes can be a cause of degradation, specifically in the
form of urban expansion.24 The result of land degradation is the
decline in productivity and usability of the land.25 For example, in
a small portion of the West Bank that is northeast of Ramallah,
urban expansion in this area has increased by fifty-one-times
since the 1940s.2 6 This urban expansion has increased pollution
of the land and water, increased the stress on other available
land resources, and caused overgrazing, which has diminished
the amount of coverage for other plants, and thereby, has caused
soil erosion.27
The urbanization in the region northeast of Ramallah is
caused by the pressure on farmers to move to urban areas or
commit their land to other economic activities other than
agriculture.28 Farmers are pressured by extreme poverty, as the
poverty rate in this area reached 57 percent of all households by
2007.29 This has caused 75 percent of farmers in this area to sell
their land for construction purposes.30 In addition, the use of
herbicides by farmers is becoming a common practice.3 ' This
2 Id.
21 Id.
2 Id.
2 Israel: Palestinians Cut Offfrom Farmlands, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 5, 2012,
5:49 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/05/israel-palestinians-cut-farmlands
[https://perma.cc/5H3C-MPNJ].
21 A- Abu Hammad & A- Tumeizi, Land Degradation: Socioeconomic and
Environmental Causes and Consequences in the Eastern Mediterranean, 23 LAND
DEGRADATION & DEV. 216 (2012).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 220.
27 Id. at 221.
2 Id. at 220.
2 Id. at 222.
3 Id. at 222-23.
31 Id. at 225.
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reduces the time required to prepare the land, replacing the
traditional, time-consuming method of ploughing for weed
control.32
Although the Israeli Security Wall is not a significant
cause of land degradation, it is clearly a cause for the greater
detriment suffered by Palestinian farmers. As Maurice Hopper
describes a typical day of work for farmers attempting to pass
through the Security Wall, "The erratic pattern of gate opening
makes life very difficult for farmers trying to access their
farmland, with much time being wasted simply waiting for the
Gate to open."33 He continues by stating, "Over one year, the
collective loss of hours can be measured in the thousands."34 The
amount of time that is spent waiting for gates to open causes
farmers to turn to alternative farming practices, such as the use
of heikbicides and overgrazing. Because farmers cannot access
their farms with adequate time to prepare the land, farmers are
pressured to sell their land for urbanization projects83 The Israeli
Security Wall has caused the farming profession to become an
inviable method of obtaining sustenance.
Farmers may be able to utilize certain farming techniques
in order to restore the fertility of the soil on their farms, but the
farmers need more access and time to utilize these methods.
First, diagnosing the soil on a farm would be the initial step in
order to determine which techniques to utilize.36 Although many
farmers in Palestine do not have the resources necessary to
diagnose the fertility of the soil, if Palestinian farmers did have
these capabilities, they would be able utilize certain techniques
involving the planting of legumes or other soil-enriching plant
varietieS37 Until the farmers are provided the opportunity to work
on their farms for substantial periods of time, their farmland will
be degraded and continuously damaged as they are unable to
employ techniques to restore the fertility in the soil.
32 Id.
3 3 Hopper, supra note 8, at 133.
34 Id. at 133, 135.
3 Hammad, supra note 24, at 223.
36 Bekunda Mateete et al., Restoring Soil Fertility in Sub-Sahara Africa, 108
ADVANCES AGRONOMY 183, 192 (2010).
37 Id. at 193-94.
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Palestinian farmers share many of the same harms that
other Palestinians have suffered due to the construction of the
Israeli Security Wall. Palestinian farmers, however, have greatly
suffered in their professions as farmers. Palestinian farmers lost
past profits due to the construction of the Security Wall, and they
will incur future lost profits as the productivity of their farms will
decrease. There is an established solution to the issue of the
Israeli Security Wall, yet the solution fails in two aspects: the
solution has no binding authority and it fails to redress past
losses that Palestinian farmers have suffered and will suffer due
to the construction of the Security Wall.
C The Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Israel
Security Wall
The International Court of Justice issued an advisory
opinion on the Israeli Security Wall on July 9, 2004.38 The
International Court of Justice ruled that the Security Wall
violated international law and that construction of the Wall
should cease.8 9 The International Court of Justice further
demanded that the parts of the wall that were constructed must
be dismantled.40 This ruling was followed by a United Nations
resolution demanding that Israel comply with the legal ruling of
the International Court of Justice.41 150 countries voted in favor
of the resolution; whereas, six countries did not vote in favor of
the resolution.42 Among those countries was the United States.43
The Security Council has binding authority in the UN-which the
United States is a member-while the General Assembly does
not." Thereby, the ruling of the International Court of Justice
was not implemented. However, even if it had, Palestinian
farmers would still be unable to recover for lost profits.
38 Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The IGJ Ruling on Israeli's
Security WaBl, 99 A.J.I.L. 42, 193 (2005).
39 Id.
4 Idr
41 Id.
4 2 Id.
4 3 Id.
11 ANTHONY S. WINER ET AL., INT'L LAw LEG.AL RESEARCH 58-59 (2013).
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No legal system has established a compensatory scheme
that would allow Palestinian farmers to recover for the harms
suffered. Because Israel voted against the resolution proposed by
the UN to enforce the ruling of International Court of Justice, it
is unlikely that Israel would establish a legal mechanism for
Palestinian farmers to recover for losses arising from the
construction of the Wall. If a Palestinian farmer brought a claim
for damages, it would be unlikely that an Israeli court would
enter judgment in favor of the farmer. Palestine's poverty rate
indicates that Palestine lacks the resources necessary to
compensate farmers for their losses. A system implemented to
allow the farmers to recover losses, therefore, needs to be
established through the United Nations under a reparations
scheme.
III. MODELS FOR A NEW COMPENSATORY MECHANISM FOR
PALESTINIAN FARMERS
A. Theories of Justice
When analyzing examples of compensatory mechanisms, it
is necessary to comprehend the different theories in justice that
underlie the compensatory scheme and mechanism. While there
are numerous theories of justice, the prevailing theories in
compensatory schemes include retributive justice, corrective
justice, distributive justice, and procedural justice.46 These
theories are not competing in application to a compensatory
scheme and mechanism, but rather they are competing with one
another in the prioritization of those who are seeking
compensation. A theory of justice may be regarded or perceived as
important, however, it may be secondary to another theory in the
perception of the person seeking compensation.
A victim punishing a violator is known as retributive
justice.47 Retributive justice punishes the violator for causing
4 5Falk, supra note 38, at 42.
46 Lindy Rouillard-Labb, Justice Among the Ashes: How Government
Compensation Facilities Can Bring Justice to Disaster Victims, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
245, 258-61 (2015).
4 Id. at 258.
4832016-2017
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emotional harm to the victim and surfaces largely in criminal
laws as a person endures a punishment for the harm they have
committed.48 Although a state may not be motivated to punish a
criminal actor for the emotional and psychological harms against
a victim, the victim may perceive that the criminal actor should
be punished for those harms. Theories of justice may apply to
various actors in a particular circumstance, which is dependent
upon their relationship with the criminal and their role in the
criminal proceeding. While a state may be motivated to punish a
criminal to due to its obligation to uphold the law, an individual
may be motivated to participate in a trial because they feel
obligated to seek justice for their emotional and psychological
suffering.
Another similar fault-based theory is corrective justice.
Instead of imposing a punishment on the violator, corrective
justice aims to restore justice by providing monetary
compensation to the victim.49 This type of justice is found in tort
regimes, as it requires a wrongful actor, or tortfeasor, to pay the
victim for the harm they have caused.50 A predominant principle
in the tort doctrine is to restore the status or position of a victim
to her original status before suffering the harm.5 ' This principle,
however, does not further corrective justice in certain instances.
The establishment of liability insurance removes the requirement
for tortfeasors to pay for the damages incurred by the victims of
their tortious conduct.52 In certain compensatory schemes,
corrective justice is not applied.
There may be, however, a more prominent tort doctrine
than corrective or retributive justice known as distributive
justice. This theory of justice emphasizes the fairness of the
distribution of goods.53 Distributive justice is concerned with
allocations of goods based on needs, equality, or equity concerns
48 Id. at 258-59.
49 Id.
5o Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan, Civil Liability, Theories of NEW OXFORD
COMPANION TO L. (2009),
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.uky.eduview/10.1093/acrefl9780199290543.001.0
001/acref-9780199290543-e-289?.
51 Id.
52 I
53 Rouillard-Labbb, supra note 46, at 260.
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based on a recipient's merits or contributions.54 Distributions
made on the basis of need prioritize the needs of the poorest
recipients first.55 Equal distributions allocate resources in equal
shares to the recipients.56 Equity distributions based on a
recipient's merit or contribution will be based on effort, sacrifice,
ability, and performance.57 Conversely, distributive justice is
solely concerned with a victim's harm and their harm in relation
to another victim. Distributive justice is primarily used when
there is more than one victim.
Overwhelmingly, procedural justice is the highest in
priority for victims seeking compensation.58 Procedural justice
pertains to the fairness in the decision-making process.59 This
theory balances the inequality of power between the government
or legal authority and the individual seeking compensation.60
When victims are attempting to promote accountability, gain
information, effectuate change, and obtain acknowledgement of
their harms, procedural justice ensures their desires manifest.6 '
Procedural justice is solely focused on the method and process to
achieve an outcome.62 Standing, trust, and neutrality are factors
that influence the perceptions of procedural justice.63 Standing is
the opportunity, or lack thereof, that allows victims to express
their perspective in relation to their harms.6 4 Trust is based upon
individual interactions between the victim and the decision-
makers.65 If a victim is treated disrespectfully or in an
undignified manner, they will have less trust in the decision-
maker.66 Honesty, consistency, and unbiased treatment allow
victims to view a decision-maker as neutral, which legitimizes the
decision-maker.67
54[d
55Id.
56 1d.
57 Id.
8 Id. at 261-62.
59 M at 259.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 259-60.
62 Id. at 260.
w Id.
CA Id.
651d.
67 Id.
4852016-2017
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As procedural justice appears to be the primary theory in
the perception of victims, the government bears the responsibility
of ensuring justice and being just in the process of procuring
justice for the victims. If the victims suffer further injustice due
to the schemes and mechanisms established by the government,
then the government may be perceived as a new violator, and the
victim may seek additional compensation or attribute more
accountability towards the government. When constructing a new
compensatory scheme or mechanism for Palestinian farmers,
however, it is necessary to examine and analyze previously
established schemes and mechanisms. They will serve as
examples and be useful to discern which measures are effective in
applying the various theories of justice.
B. International Compensatory Mechanisms
i. Reparation schemes in the United Nations
In the United Nations, there are mechanisms for
compensating indigenous peoples for harms they have suffered.
Palestinians have not been legally classified as "indigenous", and
they are, therefore, unable to take advantage of those
procedures.68 If Palestinians fell under this classification, their
harms would most likely be left unresolved or uncompensated.
There are three bodies in the United Nations and two primary
treaty-based mechanisms devoted to indigenous peoples' issues.
First, the United Nations Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues advises other councils in the United Nations
about indigenous issues.69 Additionally, representatives of
indigenous groups have the ability to raise their issues and
present recommendations in the public forum sessions.70 The
Expert Mechanism mainly focuses on advice based on studies and
research. Similar to the United Nations Permanent Forum on
6 Ryan Bellerose, UN Guidelines: Jews are indigenous to Israel, ISR. & STUFF,
https://www.israelandstuff.com/under-un-gulablines-jews-are-indigenous-to-israel-
palestinians-are-not (last updated Apr. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5HKJ-VDGX].
6 IG. Agung Made Wardana, Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in
International La w, 9 INDONESIAN J. INT'L L. 309, 316 (2012).
70
d
THE GRASS IS GREENER
Indigenous Issues, indigenous groups can communicate with the
Special Rapporteur, which was established to examine the
circumstances of indigenous peoples around the world.7 ' This is
executed through communications or visits to the countries.72 The
primary failure of these bodies is their lack of jurisdiction in the
international community, as well as the legally, non-binding
status of their advice and recommendations against states.73
There are two primary treaties that are utilized by
indigenous peoples. The International Labor Organization
Conventions ("ILO") established mechanisms that allow for labor
unions to file complaints.74 Indigenous groups cannot directly file
a complaint with the ILO, but they can file a complaint through a
participating labor union.7 5 Unlike the previous bodies
mentioned, the ILO is legally binding upon the states that are a
party to the convention.7 6 Still, when implementing a remedy, the
ILO committee that is adjudicating the complaint usually gives
deference to domestic procedures.7 7
Also, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") carries little authority in the international
community. The ICCPR reviews reports from state parties on the
compliance of the covenant.78 Indigenous groups can submit
information as well.7 9 Under the Optional Protocol, individuals
can submit communications, which act as a complaint, but the
Committee is not required to review the communication
submitted. Like the previous bodies mentioned, the ICCPR does
not have the authority to issue sanctions against a state party,
nor are decisions of the Committee legally binding on state
parties.80
71 Id.
72 Id. at 316-17.
7 Id. at 317.
7M 8d.
75Id
761_d.
77 Id. at 318.
78 Id.
80 Id. at 318-19.
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ii. Regional compensatory regimes
Contrary to the bodies of the United Nations, regional
bodies and human rights regimes have binding authority in the
jurisdiction that is being served. There are two predominant
regional human rights regimes. While there are other regional
bodies in the international community, the Inter-America system
along with the African Commission on Human and People's
Rights ("ACHPR") are effective and exemplary models for
compensatory regimes under regional bodies. A new
compensatory mechanism must be constructed as these
established regimes do not have jurisdiction over Palestine.
The Inter-America system consists of the Inter-America
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.8 1 A petition or communication can be submitted
from an individual, group, or non-governmental organization
("NGO") to the Inter-America Commission on Human Rights
concerning violations of the American Convention, but before the
petition or communication is submitted, domestic remedies must
have been exhausted.82 Moreover, the Inter-America Commission
on Human Rights recommends that a violation is to be presented
to the Inter-America Court of Human Rights.8 3 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, contrarily, has jurisdiction to
adjudicate cases that are submitted." These bodies have
jurisdiction to legally bind the state parties.8 5
The Inter-America System is effective in allowing petitions
from individuals, groups, or NGOs. This allows petitioners who
are marginalized and have little power in society and in politics
to file petitions in order to seek the enforcement of their rights.
This procedural fairness ultimately is undermined by requiring a
petitioner to exhaust the domestic remedies. The procedural
fairness of the Inter-America system can be compromised by the
procedural injustices of the domestic remedies of the target-
country. Although the Inter-America system has allowed
81 Id. at 320.
82 Id.
8 Id.
84 Id.
8 Id
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marginalized groups, such as Inuit peoples, to bring petitions,
there is no legal exception to override the procedural requirement
of exhaustion.
Similar to the Inter-America system, the ACHPR provides
complaint procedures for communications from states or
individual communication.8 In addition, NGOs can submit
communications as well.8 7 Although there is no requirement that
domestic remedies be exhausted in order to submit
communications, they must be unduly prolonged.88 The ACHPR
promotes and monitors human rights implementation in the
jurisdiction as well. The ACHPR does not have the procedural
requirement of exhaustion, as the Inter-America System did, yet,
there is still a requirement to prove the domestic procedure is
unduly long. This requirement is more lenient than the
requirement imposed by the Inter-America system, but it
effectively imposes the same process for petitioners to bring their
claims to the ACHPR.
These regional regimes are effective for only some peoples,
as their jurisdiction is regional.89 The Inter-America system has
jurisdiction over the countries in the Americas who have signed
and ratified the convention.90 Similarly, the ACHPR is limited to
African nations in its jurisdiction, and, thus, Palestine cannot
utilize these supranational organizations.91 Furthermore, these
regional bodies require a petitioner to exhaust the domestic
remedies in their home countries, which can lead to an arduous
and extensive process to bring a claim to the regional body. This
could lead to victims perceiving a failure in the procedure to be
fair, promote accountability, and obtain acknowledgment for their
harms.
8 Id. at 321.
8 Id.
88 Id.
8 Id.
90 Multilateral Treaties, ORG. Am. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treatiescentralauthoritiesbybvmembes-states.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7X8P-67GX].
91 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLE'S RTS., http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-
democracy/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) [https://perma.c/YV22-KHILA].
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iii. The International Criminal Court's Victims' Trust Fund
A prominent reason for procedural justice to not be
effectuated for Palestinian farmers in a regional regime is the
process of adjudicating claims. A purely judicial regime can allow
for injustice to occur as a result of unduly long delays and
effectively arbitrary decisions. A different mechanism with
extrajudicial aspects for Palestinian farmers may be more
effective in redressing the harms created by the construction of
the Israeli Security Wall. For example, the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") utilizes a trust fund for victims of
international crimes and human rights violations.92 There are
other funds for victims of crimes in the international community,
but the Trust Fund of the ICC is robust and flexible.
The Rome Statute, an international convention,
established the ICC in 2002.93 Before the sixtieth ratification in
July of 2002, the Preparatory Commission established the legal
principles of the ICC.9 4 Upon the sixtieth ratification of the Rome
Statute, the Assembly of State Parties ("ASP") became
responsible for drafting the functional elements of the ICC.95 In
the "Road Map," established by the ASP, the Victims' Trust Fund
of the ICC was planned to be established.9 6
The ICC's Trust Fund operates in conjunction with the
principles of remedies within the ICC. The International
Criminal Court utilizes financial restitution as a punishment
against one who commits a crime.97 The ICC does not burden the
state of the criminal actor with compensating the victims. 9 8 When
the ICC orders reparations to be made to the Victims' Trust
Fund, the money is transferred directly from the criminal actor to
the fund.9 9 Nevertheless, the Victims' Trust Fund does not control
92 Peter G. Fischer, The Victims' Trust Fund of the International Criminal
Court- Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 187, 202
(2003).
9 WINER, supra note 44, at 130.
9 Fischer, supra note 92, at 187-88.
5 Id. at 189.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 200.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 205.
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the money that is transferred from the criminal actor, as the ICC
determines the amount and form of reparations along with the
time that payments are to be made.xoo The ICC can order for the
reparations to be made to the affected individual or order lump
sums to be distributed to a group of affected individuals through
the Victims' Trust Fund. 101
Reparations from people who are convicted by the ICC is
merely one manner in which the Victims' Trust Fund receives
money. States, non-state organizations, and private individuals
can provide monetary contributions to the Trust Fund.102 Also,
the fund may receive the fines and forfeitures that are levied
against criminals by the ICC.103 With respect to money that has
not been awarded by the ICC, the Victims' Trust Fund has
discretion in the distribution of funds to the victims.10 4 Still, there
are severe issues concerning financing the fund, such as the
compensation made to victims and logistically giving the
compensation to the victims.
First, voluntary contributions are a primary source of
funding, along with fines and forfeitures.0 5 Fines and forfeitures
that are levied against a criminal, however, might not be
collected in a timely manner. 106 For example, in the cases of In re
Marcos & Doe v. Karazdic, substantial amounts of fines and
forfeitures were issued against the criminal actor, but merely a
small portion of those amounts have been collected.10 7 Little of
the amount levied against the criminals has been collected
because the corresponding states have not made significant
efforts to enforce the judgment.08 Thus, the amount of funding is
trammeled by the lack of collecting fines and forfeitures.
Moreover, fines and forfeitures paid to the Victims' Trust
Fund may not compensate the initial victims as adequately as
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 M. at 207.
10 d
104 .
15 Id. at 215, 217.
106 Id at 219.
107 Id. at 218-19.
s Id,
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later victims.109 As litigation proceeds, more compensation is
awarded, whereas those amounts are much less in the initial
stages of the litigation." 0 Consequently, when recipient victims
receive their compensation, it will be from a smaller amount of
funds.1 ' This is because the sources of funding are considered to
be more reliable.112
As seen previously with collecting fines and forfeitures,
distributing compensation awards does not consistently reach the
victims. In the ICC's Victim's Trust Fund, there is no procedure
that allows for awards to be directly transferred from the Fund to
the victims.s13 For example, during the antebellum period in
Kosovo, where victims of crimes could be awarded compensation,
there were no judicial or administrative bodies that were able to
distribute the funds."4 Administrative procedures in Kosovo were
inadequate to distribute identification cards."5 In countries with
weak infrastructures, distributing compensation awards to the
victims can be logistically impossible.
The ICC's Victims' Trust Fund embodies the principles of
corrective and distributive justice. The criminal actor is forced to
pay compensation to the victims, and when there are numerous
victims, the fund distributes and manages the compensation in a
manner as to increase the effectiveness of the compensation. The
ICC has failed to establish a procedure to securely and
consistently provide the compensation to the victims, which
undermines the attempt to preserve principles of the corrective
and distributive justice in the ICC. Furthermore, the ICC
Victims' Trust Fund fails in procedural justice as the state of the
criminal actor is not held accountable, and in some instances, the
state completely disregards its obligation to enforce the
requirement of compensation on the criminal actor.
This is primarily a result of the immense judicial process
of the ICC. A remedy that provides compensation with less
lo -d. at 218.
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potential to compromise the principles of the various theories of
justice would entail a scheme and mechanism that is
predominantly extrajudicial. While there may be judicial
procedures, there are examples that have been more efficient and
effective in providing compensation to victims.
C Domestic Compensatory Mechanisms
Extrajudicial domestic programs and mechanisms have
shown to be more successful than international and regional
judicial courts and conventions. One reason is that domestic
programs do not encompass the large geographic regions
international and regional bodies cover. Another contributing
factor is that domestic programs are largely utilized in response
to incidents, such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters,
whereas international and regional bodies are dedicated to
overarching goals and principles. These factors are more
incidental, as the primary effectiveness of a domestic program is
its ability to ensure the various theories of justice are
implemented throughout the programs. Two primary examples of
a domestic program is the 9/11 Victims' Fund and the Lake
Manitoba Financial Assistance Program.
i. 9/11 Victims'Fund
After the tragedy of 9/11, the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act ("ATSSSA") was signed into law on
September 22, 2001, eleven days after it was introduced.1 16 The
act was initially proposed to prevent the airline industry from
collapsing, and within a day of its proposal, a compensation
program for the victims of 9/11 was added to the bill.1 17 According
to the ATSSSA, a Special Master was to be appointed by the
Attorney General to administer the program.118 This position was
unprecedented, as the position was not a judicial officer or
116 Robyn K. Brown, In Case Terror Strikes America Again: Considering a
Permanent Fund for Victims of Terrorism, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 869, 872 (2012).
' 17 8d.
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administrative agent.119 Kenneth Feinberg was appointed as the
Special Master, due to his experience as a special master in other
circumstances.120
Before other actions were taken, regulations were
established to administer the fund.121 The initial section of the
ATSSSA established the definition of a "claimant".1 2 2 Section 405
states that a claimant is an individual who was present at any of
the targeted sites or a member of the flight crew or a passenger of
any of the flights that were hijacked by the terrorists.123 A
claimant must also have suffered physical harm or death as a
result of the plane crash.124 Section 405 did not provide
compensation for those who suffered psychological harm or latent
injuries caused by exposure to toxins.125
Upon determining the eligibility of a victim seeking
compensation, the ATSSSA established the calculations for
determining monetary awards. The calculation for monetary
awards was based on the economic loss, noneconomic loss, and
funds that are recoverable from collateral sources, such as life
insurance and death benefits, that can offset the awards.126
Though a maximum award was not specified, the award to one
person would not diminish the award of another claimant.127
According to Feinberg, minimal disparity between monetary
awards was an objective.128
In order to receive a monetary award from the Fund, a
claimant was required to submit a thirty-one-page application.129
During the application process, claimants could choose between
two tracks. Under Track A, claimants would receive an award
determination within forty-five days of their submission.130 The
claimant would then be able to accept the award or request a
1]9 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 874.
122 Id
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 875.
127 I
1m Id.
1
2Id. at 876.
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hearing.131 Contrarily, Track B would allow for claimants to
proceed into a hearing upon establishing their eligibility. 132 If a
claimant proceeded with a hearing, they would be given the
opportunity to be represented by counsel, submit evidence, and
call witnesses.133 Once the hearing was concluded, the Fund was
required to notify the claimant, in writing, of the award
determination within 120 days.134 Submitting an application
required claimants to waive their right to bring later claims in
tort litigation.135
Additionally, families were given the opportunity to meet
with Feinberg in order to receive an estimate regarding the range
of the award they may possibly receive.36 This allowed families
to discern whether to file an application or bring a claim in tort
litigation.137 If claimants were in need of immediate funds, they
could request emergency funds.138 If a claimant utilized
emergency funds, then the advance on the benefits would be
deducted from the awards to be received in the future.139
Claimants were allowed to file their claims until December 22,
2003.140
However, there were some issues and criticisms of the
Fund. Firstly, the Fund was established to prevent the collapse of
the airline industry. Although victim compensation was an
objective, its primary purpose was to protect the airline industry
from a torrent of litigation by precluding claims if applicants
chose immediate funds. The effect of this was a feeling of
dehumanization as claimants interacted with the Fund.141
Moreover, the Fund did not provide the healing that claimants
and their families were seeking.142 The claim process worsened
1'1 See id.
132 I
1 Id.
142 Id.
137 Id
138Id.
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141 Id. at 877.
142 Id. at 878.
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family conflicts in some instances.143 Claimants largely criticized
the arduous and complex process of submitting an application, as
well.1"
Therefore, while the 9/11 Fund had positive features, it
was not sufficient to entirely implement procedural justice. Along
with dehumanization, applicants felt the Fund did not provide
adequate compensation for psychological and emotional harms.
These factors show that the 9/11 Victims' Fund struggled to
implement procedural justice. Ensuring procedural justice was
not a primary goal of the Fund, but rather it was an ancillary
objective that was limited to physical harms. Canada has
implemented a compensation program that is similar to the 9/11
Fund but with significant differences.
ii. Lake Manitoba Financial Assistance Program
In 2011, the Manitoba Province in Canada experienced a
year of high soil moisture freeze-up, above-average snowfall,
heavy rains, and severe winds.145 Rivers across the province were
flooding and lakes were rising to hazardous levels.146 As a result,
there were more than 7,100 evacuees in the First Nations
Community.147 Still, after two years of the floods, approximately
2,000 people remained displaced from their homes, as they were
uninhabitable.1 48 In addition to residential damage, 3 million
acres of farmland was unseeded in 2011.149 Approximately 500
provincial and municipal roads and nearly 500 bridges were
damaged.1 5 0 Within two years of the floods, the costs associated
with preparing for and battling flooding, repairing to
infrastructure, and disaster payments reached $1.2 billion. 15 1
'13Id.
'44 IJd.
'4 Manitoba 2011 Flood Review Task Force Report, MANITOBA 2011 FLOOD REV.
TASK FORCE at 1 (Apr. 2013),
https://www.gov.mb.ca/asset library/en/2011flood/flood review task force report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7ZE-FWQK].
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In 1987, the Canadian province of Manitoba established a
disaster financial assistance fund.152 This program was expanded
into six special programs in the midst of floods that occurred in
2011.153 One of the special programs established to mitigate flood
damage was the Lake Manitoba Financial Assistance Program
("Lake Manitoba FAP"). The Lake Manitoba FAP was dedicated
to assisting crop and livestock producers with transporting
livestock and to alleviate the effects of the flooding, meet feed
requirements, mitigate damage to agricultural infrastructure,
and other assistance efforts in the agricultural sector.154
Moreover, the Lake Manitoba FAP Program provided
compensation to residents for damages incurred directly from the
high water levels during the floods.155 Small businesses were
reimbursed for their property damage and loss of income as a
result of the flooding by the Lake Manitoba FAP Program as
well.15 6 This program also compensated residents for damages
incurred due to the high levels of water.157
Individual, residential claimants were reimbursed for
emergency flood measures, property damage to residences,
incremental living costs that were incurred from temporary
relocation, and measures utilized to reduce vulnerability to future
flood damage.158 Nonetheless, not all expenses were recovered
under the Lake Manitoba FAP. Costs that could be covered by
insurance were not included along with intangible losses, medical
expenses, loss of income, and loss of market value.159 Contrary to
the 9/11 Fund, claimants applying for assistance from the Lake
Manitoba FAP were not required to waive their tort claims.160
However, the Lake Manitoba FAP had a deadline similar
to that of the 9/11 Victims' Fund. In order to receive
compensation, residents were required to file an application form
162 Rouillard-Labb, supra note 46, at 251.
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no later than November 30, 2011.161 Applicants had to provide
sufficient evidence and documentation verifying the amount of
losses incurred.162 The amount of compensation was determined
by the Lake Manitoba FAP Administrator.163 The Administrator
determined the amount based on evidence, documentation that
was submitted, and an on-site inspection.164 Unlike the 9/11
Victims' Fund, the Lake Manitoba FAP did not provide claimants
with a right to a hearing.165 Deadlines for decisions made by the
Administrator were not implemented as opposed to the 9/11
Fund.6 6 Still, claimants had the option to appeal the award to
the Building and Recovery Action Plan Appeals Commission. 167 If
an appeal was made, the Commission held non-public hearings
allowing for claimants to present new evidence.16 s
If a claimant's application was deemed ineligible, it would
have been based on several determinations. For example, an
applicant could have been determined to be in an area that was
not covered by the program.169 Another reason ineligibility was
that a claimant applied for a program inadvertently. 170
Consequently, an applicant would be redirected to the
appropriate program.171 In other instances, there were
administrative mistakes, such as a claimant filing multiple
applications, or the administrator of the program created
duplicate claims for one claimant.172
By September 30, 2012, 5,573 individuals and small
businesses filed a claim with the Lake Manitoba FAP.173 In total,
CAN $79,772,511 were distributed to claimants.174 Out of 6,472
claims, 809 claims were deemed ineligible.175 Furthermore, there
161 Id. at 253.
162 Id
16 Id.
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165Id.
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168Id.
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were 256 appeals made after claimants received an award from
the Lake Manitoba FAP.e76 208 appeals remained unheard by
September 30, 2012.177 The Disaster Financial Assistance ("DFA")
program, which includes the Lake Manitoba FAP, was
overwhelmed with administrative blunders.178 There was a lack
of staff in the DFA, paperwork from claimants was lost, and rural
citizens felt discrimination, as they were required to travel to
major centers for their claims.179 Also, there was little effort from
the Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada
department to work closely with the Emergency Measures
Organization to ensure that First Nations communities would
understand the DFA program and its relation to disaster
management.80
Ultimately, the compensation distributed by the DFA
program was largely criticized by a majority of the claimants. A
study conducted by Lindy Rouillard-Labbe, counsel for the
Canadian Department of Justice, surveyed perceptions and
reflections on the DFA program that was implemented in the
Lake Manitoba region. It showed that 68 percent of 176 people
perceived the amount of compensation awarded to them was
unfair.18' Moreover, in a sample size of 171 people, 71 percent
found the criteria utilized to assess the value of incurred damages
were unfair.182 Contrastingly, 53 percent of 171 people perceived
that the procedure of the DFA program allowed them to
participate to their desired extent. 183
After the flooding, over 75 percent of the respondents
involved in the study conducted by Rouillard-Labbe attributed
their losses to government action.184 While the reflections on the
government's actions were critical, they were not
condemnatory.185 Respondents largely considered the losses that
176 See id.
177 See id. at 108.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 109.
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resulted from the floods to be caused by the government's actions
and felt the government should bear the burden of compensating
individuals who suffered due to the government's response to the
flood.186 Along with bearing the responsibility of compensation, a
recurring theme was iterated by respondents demanding the
government to admit the causal relationship between the
government's actions and the damages incurred by citizens.187
This perception did burden the government with the duty
of compensation, but the perception largely stems from the
principles of procedural justice. Rouillard-Labbe explains that
respondents with more salient harms were dissatisfied because of
the limited opportunities to express their complaints regarding
the program.'sa Overall, Rouillard-Labbe's study showed that
respondents who received higher compensation awards were
more dissatisfied with the Lake Manitoba FAP. 189 Those who
suffered more from the floods prioritized their desire to express
their complaints and harms suffered.190 Thus, compensation
amounts were a secondary priority for those who suffered, and
the attribution of responsibility and expression were a primary
priority in the perceptions of the respondents. 191
According to the respondents, the Lake Manitoba FAP
failed to justly compensate. The majority of the respondents did
not understand the reasoning behind the outcome.192
Furthermore, the predominant purpose of the Lake Manitoba
FAP was to compensate, and with respondents overwhelmingly
feeling that their compensation was unfair, the program failed.
Therefore, the 9/11 Victims' Fund and the Lake Manitoba
Financial Assistance Program were more successful in ensuring
justice than the schemes and mechanisms in the United Nations
and regional regimes. However, these domestic programs still
failed to completely ensure justice as many of those utilizing
these programs felt that they were not given procedural justice.
186 Id
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In constructing a compensatory scheme or mechanism for
Palestinian farmers, it is necessary to implement the many
theories of justice, but procedural justice should be of the highest
priority.
IV. A NEW COMPENSATORY MODEL FOR PALESTINIAN FARMERS
As mentioned previously, Israel has refused to accept
responsibility for the negative effects caused by the Israeli
Security Wall. Moreover, the Israeli Supreme Court in the case of
Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel found that the Israeli
Security Wall complied with international law.193 The Israeli
Supreme Court ruled that the wall must be moved to reduce the
burden upon Palestinians. Yet, the Supreme Court still held that
Israel had the authority to build the Wall. Clearly, since this
opinion was issued, there was still Palestinian land appropriated
by the Israeli Security Wall. In order to establish a new
compensatory mechanism for Palestinian farmers, there must be
another body - not Israel - that will bear the duty to compensate
the farmers. Although there are models for judicial bodies to
adjudicate claims brought by Palestinian farmers, extrajudicial
bodies will be more effective in ensuring procedural justice.
A. Judicial Mechanisms
Because Israel refuses to be held accountable for the
harms that the Israeli Security Wall has caused to Palestinian
farmers, it would be unlikely for a judicial body to be established
to redress the harms. Requiring a state that did not cause the
harms to compensate the farmers would be antithetical to a
theory of justice. In the unlikely circumstance that Israel accepts
the burden of compensating the farmers by signing a convention
or agreeing to comply with the international community's
requests pertaining to the Wall, a judicial body could be
constructed similar to that of other UN bodies. Moreover, this
may not be conflicting with the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice regarding the Israeli Security
' Malone, supra note 1, at fn. 152.
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Wall, as the opinion deems the wall to be illegal, but it does not
provide a method of compensation to the Palestinians who have
suffered losses. In this scenario, the structure of a claim is
dependent on the body that establishes the procedure for
adjudicating claims.
The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues, the Expert Mechanism, and the Special Rapporteur
cannot adjudicate claims, since these bodies are not legal
authorities, but a body similar to the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") or International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights may be effective in adjudicating claims. Like the
ILO, a body could be established that allows Palestinian farmers
to file claims for compensation through a labor union. Palestinian
farmers would have the opportunity to file a claim on behalf of an
entire group. Instead of filing claims for adjudication through a
labor union, the population of Palestinian farmers could file as a
group to a body similar to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. The primary difference between this
procedure and the ILO is that farmers would not be required to
act within a labor union. Both models still require farmers to
form an organized group in order to bring a claim. With the
model in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, there is a review process of the country that ensures
compliance with the covenant. This procedure is significant as it
would allow Israel to be monitored to ensure that compensation
is, in fact, being distributed to petitioners.
A judicial mechanism could be established through a
regional body as well. The Inter-America system and the ACHPR
allowed individuals, groups, and NGOs to file communications in
order to be adjudicated. Like the Inter-America system, there
could be a commission that reviews a communication in order to
establish that it is not frivolous and should be sent for
adjudication by a court. The Inter-America system can sanction a
non-compliant state, which the new regional court for
Palestinians could then implement to ensure compliance with the
convention. Because Palestinians have no domestic remedies, the
requirement of exhausting domestic remedies, or establishing
that domestic procedures are unduly found in the Inter-America
system and ACHPR should not be included in a new regional
body for Palestinians.
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A judicial body modeled from the previous examples may
be too burdensome on the state of Israel. A mechanism structured
similarly to the International Criminal Court may ease the
financial and administrative weight on Israel. In a similar
procedure, the Palestinian farmers would file their claims, and if
they are awarded compensation, the compensation could be
distributed to a trust fund established by the court. In order to
avoid the ICC Victim's Trust Fund's inability to ensure that
compensation is distributed, the new court could utilize the
aforementioned enforcing procedures to ensure the farmers are
properly compensated.
While there are viable models for a judicial body to redress
the harms suffered by Palestinian farmers due to the
construction of the Israeli Security Wall, the establishment of
such a body is contingent on numerous factual circumstances that
are unlikely to occur. Also, seeking compensation through judicial
adjudication can be extraneous and arduous, which may cause
other recipients to receive compensation much later than that of
previous recipients. This would lead to a frustration of procedural
justice principles. Lastly, many Palestinian farmers may be
unable to pay for the costs of filing claims and representation in a
court.
B. The Extrajudicial Mechanism
Judicial bodies may fail to ensure efficiency and
procedural justice, but extrajudicial mechanisms will be more
successful. As seen with the 9/11 Fund and the Lake Manitoba
FAP, claimants were able to submit an application to establish
their qualification for compensation for their harms. A body could
be established under the United Nations or a regional convention
that implements an extrajudicial program. Israel could
administer this program, but the likelihood of Israel ensuring
procedural justice for Palestinians seems low. Thus, it would be
prudent to administer the program through a UN or regional
body established solely for the purpose of compensating
Palestinian farmers.
Under this program, Palestinian farmers would submit an
application and a special master or administrator would
determine whether the farmer qualified for compensation. Also, a
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requirement for a timely decision should be required in order to
provide notice to claimants. Thereafter, if claimants are
dissatisfied with their compensation, or lack thereof, they could
file for an appeal. The appeal process should also be subject to a
deadline to provide timely adjudication. The program should
include a fund or a trust fund similar to the ICC's Victims' Trust
Fund, but the predominant financial issue for this program is the
source of funding. The UN may be able to require Israel to pay a
large compensation sum to the program, and the compensation
awards are distributed from that payment. However, if a
compensatory payment is the only source of funding, a
compensation award to one claimant will decrease depending on
the compensation awarded to another claimant. Because this
would cause procedural injustice, the 9/11 Victims' Fund
intentionally avoided this outcome.
Therefore, funding must come from other sources, but it is
not unlikely that other countries in the UN or the regional body
would fail to provide charitable contributions to the program. A
more reliable source of income would be to require a membership
fee to the convention, which would be distributed to the program.
Member states to the convention may be easily persuaded to pay
a membership fee if the convention provides useful resources to
the member states. These are important and necessary matters
to consider, but the foremost issue is the determination of the
award and the involvement of claimants in the process. The
determining the amount of compensation can be based on
numerous factors, such as the value of the property when it was
purchased, the decrease in value over time since the construction
of the Israeli Security Wall, the change in income since the
construction of the Wall, and the decrease in productivity of the
farm and its relation to potential future profits. Emotional harms
can be considered as the application can request claimants to
describe their living situations and financial insecurities. The
application may, in addition, inquire as to the amount that the
claimant reflects they should be awarded. Lastly, the program
could establish routine hearings for claimants to express their
complaints and reflections as to whether the program ensures
procedural justice. Clearly, this program would provide more
procedural justice to the Palestinian farmers compared to a
judicial program.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably the most
divisive, long-standing conflict facing our international
institutions today. It is a conflict that has lasted for generations
and will continue well into the foreseeable future. This conflict
has spilled into other countries affecting international relations
and global dynamics throughout the world. For a global
community to peacefully exist, there must be resolutions made to
ensure there is justice in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In
redressing extensive and expansive harms, a smaller harm can be
redressed: Palestinian farmers are a subset of a population that
is discernable and manageable in applying a remedy.
There are numerous remedies that could be applied
through various schemes, mechanisms, and bodies. It is critical
that a just compensatory remedy is applied in order to ensure
that more harm does not occur and the conflict does not engulf
more people. A perfect remedy cannot be applied to Palestinian
farmers, but there are effective compensatory schemes and
mechanisms that can be utilized as models. As seen from the
extensive analysis of the various bodies, mechanisms, regimes,
and models, the most effective and procedurally just mechanism,
to compensate Palestinian farmers would be a program
established under the United Nations or a regional convention
ensuring the claimants are compensated justly and treated
respectfully. If procedural justice is ensured by a compensatory
program, then a peaceful solution may begin to be unearthed
from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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